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With admirable directness and simplicity, our Constitution
guarantees both a "free press" and a "fair trial." Unhappily,
circumstance sometimes requires us to translate these guarantees
from their terse eloquence into perplexing practice. At that point,
we discover that the exercise of a free press often makes it impossible
to provide a fair trial. Unfortunately typical are the cases where
an editorial or a broadcast goes into damaging detail, and even
conclusion, about a particular crime when the accused has yet to be
tried. Free press-and by the word "press" I include radio, tele-
vision, and the movies-is given express protection in the Constitution
in the first amendment. An equally firm insistence on due process
of law, our ancient shorthand for fair trial procedure, is likewise
found in the fifth amendment. Both of these constitutional concepts
are binding on the States through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. What we find ourselves presented with,
therefore, is a confrontation between equally important but conflict-
ing social values. How can we secure one right without denying
the other? It would be a beggarly description of freedom to say
that the media have the freedom to be responsible and that, if they
are not responsible, they should not be free. But words like
"irresponsibility," of course, only indicate that we have reached
a result. They have nothing to say about the process required to
resolve problems that necessarily emerge in any clash between
constitutional rights of equal dignity. Indeed, despair that such a
process could ever be effected might well have led the Framers to
say, in the unequivocal way that they did, that the press must be
free. It was believed, I think, in 1791, as doubtless it is believed
today, that agreement will never be reached on what is irresponsible
and what is not. Perhaps the Framers must once again be con-
gratulated that in the first amendment, as elsewhere in our
Constitution, they forswore the false comfort that adjectives provide.
A year ago last November this subject was brought home to us
with greater impact than we should like ever to witness again. After
the assassination of President Kennedy, we watched the medium of
television bring under its relentless surveillance the protagonists in
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the incredible drama that unfolded in Dallas. For those of us who
sat in that enormous television audience, and particularly for those
of us who were lawyers, a single question haunted us throughout that
time: "Is it possible that the person or persons accused of this
crime can receive a fair trial?"
We remember news commentators on radio and television, only
hours after the assassination, saying in tones of solemn assurance,
that there could be no doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald was the
assassin of John F. Kennedy. The Warren Commission has since
verified that statement-insofar as that is possible, when the accused
is forever precluded from being called to the stand. But the media
comment before trial on the guilt or innocence of the accused and
its glaring inconsistency with any notion of fair trial was highlighted
for us in the television coverage of those terrible days.
A group of Harvard Law School professors, among them such
distinguished legal scholars as Henry Hart and Louis Jaffe, wrote
an indignant letter to the New York Times. They said:
It is too frequently a feature of our criminal justice that
it is regarded as a public carnival. And this reflects our
general obsession that everybody has a right immediately
to know and see everything, that reporters and TV cameras
must be omnipresent, that justice must take a second place
behind the public's immediate "right to be informed" about
every detail of a crime. For the fact is that justice is in-
compatible with the notion that police, prosecutors, attorneys,
reporters, and cameramen should have an unlimited right
to conduct ex parte public trials in the press and on tele-
vision.'
That full media coverage of an alleged crime is incompatible
with justice is authoritatively borne out by decisions of the Supreme
Court. At the beginning of this century, Mr. Justice Holmes in
Patterson v. Colorado 2 stated this proposition as follows: 3 "The
theory of our system is that conclusions to be reached in a case will
be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not
by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print."
But much has happened to the media since this was said in 1907;
a "medium" such as television cannot be called an "outside
influence." Television, as the case of Jack Ruby so vividly illustrates,
cannot only influence but it can fundamentally alter the direction
of the administration of justice. If Jack Ruby had not seen, flashed
on the television screen, the President's sorrowful widow and chil-
dren, would Lee Oswald have been so thoroughly removed from the
1. N. Y. Times, Dec. 3 1963, § 4 (Editorial), p. 10, col. 6.
2. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
3. Id,. at 462.
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separate inquests of trial and history? In a medium such as tele-
vision, an immediacy and intimacy is possible which is denied to
the older media. But that intimacy and immediacy are qualities
of a novel dynamism. We have clear proof of the effect of these
volatile qualities on the legal process in the events that followed
the assassination of the President. On television, the reporter, the
ostensible observer, becomes an actor. The communications-media
tail appears more and more to wag almost any dog.
Should we conclude, then, that at least for television first
amendment protection should not be extended where the administra-
tion of justice is concerned? To support such a position, it might
be contended that the older and clearly recognized Constitutional
right to receive a fair trial should be emphasized whenever there is
tension between the demands of fair trial and the assertions of a
young and all pervasive medium such as television, the nature of
which could never have been contemplated by the first amendment's
authors. But if intimacy and immediacy are, as I have suggested,
the truly arresting qualities of television, should not those qualities
be turned to advantage? Some thinkers have told us, among them
the recent but rejecting winner of the Nobel Prize, Jean Paul Sartre,
that this is a century characterized by alienation, by excessive
atomization, and by feelings dishearteningly widespread throughout
the world that individuals are powerless to alter events over which
they have neither control nor knowledge.
Perhaps then we should rebuild rather than restrict the range
of television as a medium. Is it not possible that television may yet
provide the means for an estranged citizenry to achieve a measure
of communion with government? Indeed, the quiet hope that tele-
vision can be a stimulant to an informed electorate underlies phrases
such as the "right to know." Factors such as these should discourage
easy conclusions that free press should be in some sense subordinate
to fair trial.
The task is one of reconciliation and accommodation rather
than one of choice or subordination. Mr. Justice Harlan has saliently
pointed this out in his dissent in Wood v. Georgia4 a case involving
collision between a grand jury investigation and hostile comment in
the papers inserted by a holder of political office who considered
the allegations of the judge's charge to the grand jury inflammatory
and prejudicial to him. Mr. Justice Harlan said: 5 ". . . when the
right to speak conflicts with the right to an impartial judicial pro-
ceeding, an accommodation must be made to preserve the essence
of both." The complexities of these issues, I think, are exemplified
4. 870 U.S. 375 (1962).
5. I. at 896
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by the fact that, although I agree wholeheartedly with Justice
Harlan's observation that an "accommodation" must be reached,
I cannot agree with his choice of the "accommodation" to be made
for resolving the case in which he made his observation. Wood v.
Georgia involved criticism by a sheriff of a grand jury called by
county judges to investigate "alleged Negro bloc voting" in the
county. I take it from the facts of the case that the sheriff was
generally supported by the Negro community and that he considered
the convening of a grand jury divisive and disruptive of community
relations. The Wood case, then, did not concern a jury trial of a
criminal accused. It is, thus, important to be very careful to dis-
tinguish the factual context of a case when an accommodation is
sought between fair trial and free press. Immunization of the
judiciary from public criticism is not a constitutionally guaranteed
right. Fair trial, on the other hand, is such a right. I think in the
Wood case allowing public criticism of judicial action is more
important, whatever the momentary discomfiture to the judiciary
and others involved in the grand jury proceedings.
It is at this point that our attention is properly directed to the
remedies available to cope with the dilemma of clash between free
press and fair trial. As has been suggested, subordination of one
constitutional right to gain another, particularly when both are given
apparently equivalent constitutional sanction, is not a happy solution.
This is especially so since we do not reach an end to competing
constitutional claims even if we were to make a choice in favor of
fair trial because fair trial raises its own brood of constitutional
quandaries.
Suppose a court finds that an accused has been the subject of
heated controversy in the press? Should it grant a motion for a
continuance? Suppose that the court decides to postpone the trial
until the vagaries of public passion have been spent on other themes.
The same Constitution that insists on a fair trial requires a speedy
one as well. In the famous Brinks robbery case, 6 the ingenuity of
counsel for the defense sought to exploit this inherent constitutional
conflict. The defendants contended that if they moved for a con-
tinuance, ". . . the period of alleged prejudice . . .would outlast
[any period] . . . during which a trial, properly called speedy,
might be had. ' 7 Therefore, defendants contended they could never
constitutionally be tried at all.
The dilemma of the Brinks case reveals the fundamental
difficulty in biased media-coverage concerning cases that are either
being tried or about to be tried. This problem is becoming less and
less responsive to solution by procedural devices. Continuance of
6. Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 159 N.E.2d 870, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895.
7. Id. at 880.
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the case, or, in a day of nationwide television and radio, changing
the venue, is wholly inadequate to protect the criminal accused.
As already pointed out, these devices raise delicate constitutional
problems of their own.
Is exercise of the contempt power a satisfactory way to prevent
adverse and widespread publicity damaging to the rights of the
accused at the time of trial and at the very moment of dissemination?
After the comment adverse to the accused has been disseminated,
can any remedy really help that particular accused? Some in our
country have spoken in admiration of the English practice which
prohibits all public comment concerning a case before and during
trial. The rule is enforced with great severity and its exponents
say that it results in a greater degree of fairness to the accused
than our courts are generally able to provide. It is by means of
the contempt power that the British practice of prohibiting comment
on pending judicial proceedings is enforced.
I think it is not unfair to say that by American standards the
contempt power is too freely used by some of the English judges.
For example, it has been used to strike at criticism of the judiciary.
Mr. Roland Goldfarb, who has collected some of the cases on the
subject, tells us that the following comment was made in one of the
English newspapers about the presiding justice's decision in a certain
case: 8 "Lord Justice Slessor, who can hardly be altogether un-
biased about legislation of this type, maintained that it was a very
nice provisional order or as good a one as can be expected in this
vale of tears." Now, to our American ears, this sounds harmless
enough. Nevertheless, the author was fined for contempt by, of all
people, Lord Justice Slessor.
From what I have said, I think it is clear that the English
practice, with its liberal view of the contempt power, raises
constitutional problems here that the English are not troubled with.
With the English, rooted as they are in the concept of parliamentary
sovereignty, government and legislature are one. But with us, the
judiciary is a coordinate branch of government. As such, it must
be subjected to the same criticism and inquiry to which the executive
and legislative branches are constantly exposed. What must be
emphasized in any discussion of the contempt power is that we are
concerned with protecting the rights of the accused to fair trial and
not with removing judicial conduct from public scrutiny and
occasional reproach. The fact that contempt proceedings are fre-
quently used for both purposes has, I think, led to unfortunate
confusion.
8. Goldfarb, The Impropriety of Publicity, The New Republic, Feb. 29, 1964. p. 12.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Irvin v. Dowd, 9 indicated that use
of the contempt power would do much to prevent the present tendency
to do reluctant justice by setting aside convictions long after those
convicted have already been injured beyond the power of judicial
recompense:
The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must
be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the
minds of jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner
is constitutionally protected in plying his trade. 10
What Justice Frankfurter is saying is that for a long time courts
seemed disposed to emphasize free press considerations over those
of fair trial at the moment when the accused is first prejudiced.
But when convictions obtained in such circumstances are re-examined
in a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus, after the accused has
been found guilty and incarcerated, the courts have in some cases
such as Dowd ordered the original conviction set aside on due process
grounds because the media treatment of the case at the time of
trial made a fair trial an impossibility.
This result, of course, is undesirable. If an accused is indeed
being convicted by the press and the broadcasting media rather
than by judicial procedures prescribed by statute and constitution,
it is rather a hollow victory for such a person to have his conviction
set aside after he has already spent years in prison. An example
of this sort of "doing justice backwards" is found in the recent
release, after ten years in prison, of Dr. Samuel Sheppard on a
writ of habeas corpus by a Federal District Judge in Ohio on the
ground that newspaper and broadcast suggestions of his guilt before
trial rendered the fairness of the conviction so constitutionally
doubtful as to warrant setting it aside.1
In the Sheppard case an unhappy, if inadvertent, collusion be-
tween the media and the prosecution resulted in prejudicing an entire
community to the irreparable damage of the accused. Would the
exercise of the contempt power by the trial court after the first
newspaper story or broadcast suggesting Dr. Sheppard's guilt have
prevented what ultimately happened?
Another case that invites similar reflection is Rideau v.
Louisiana, 2 which was reviewed by the Supreme Court in 1963. That
case involved the televising of an "interview" between a sheriff
and a criminal accused prior to trial. In the Rideau case, the
parish had a population of 150,000. On one of three broadcasts
9. 366 U.S. 723 (1963).
10. Id. at 730.
11. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
12. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE?
of the film an estimated 53,000 people were in the viewing audience.
Yet a motion to change the venue was denied; furthermore, no
contempt citations were issued. Two years later, after the prisoner
had been convicted and sentenced to death, the United States Supreme
Court set aside the conviction because it had been obtained in
circumstances inconsistent with due process. The Court properly
held, per Mr. Justice Stewart:
[T]his spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people
who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's
trial-at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent
court proceedings in a community so persuasively exposed
to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality.18
But one cannot help wondering why the trial judge did not issue
any contempt citations against those responsible for thus prejudicing
the cause of the accused. Moreover, perhaps the Supreme Court
should have reproached the lower court for not bringing to account
those who were responsible for so completely frustrating an accused's
right to fair trial.
Why, indeed, then hasn't the contempt power been more widely
used by the trial courts to strike at media publications that directly
injure the right of the criminal accused? According to some, the
reason is found in the United States Supreme Court's holding in the
famous case of Bridges v. California." In that case, it was held
that punishment by contempt for comment on judicial proceedings
is not permissible unless the offending publication presents a "clear
and present danger" of obstructing justice. In the judgment of Mr.
Anthony Lewis, the requirement of such a showing is so stern as
to render contempt proceedings of no use to deter damaging media
comment on criminal cases "no matter how severely the defendant's
right to a fair trial may be hurt."'1
If Mr. Lewis' criticism is valid and the contempt power is shorn
of all vitality by the Bridges rule, then perhaps in the stimulus of
the events of last fall, a reconsideration of the Bridges rule is in
order. It may be that the present line of decisions inhibit a feasible
accommodation between fair trial and free press.
It appears that we have turned down the available remedies
one by one. To what remedy, it might be asked in some measure
of desperation, should we turn? Justice Bernard S. Meyer, in the
pages of this Review, 16 has suggested a statute. I think the proposed
statute has the merit of proscribing only publications that would
13. 14. at 726.
14. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
15. Lewis, The case Of 'Trial By Press,' N. Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1964. § 6 (Magazine),
p. 98.
16. Meyer. Free Press v. Pair Trial; The Judge's View, 41 N.D.L. PREv. 14 (1964).
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be damaging to the rights of the criminal accused. I would not,
however, restrict application of the statute to trial by jury alone.
It was said anciently by an English judge that "The Devil himself
knoweth not the mind of man." We cannot know for sure what
serves to influence or sway the judgment of human beings. Judges,
I think, no less than jurors, are capable of being swayed by media
coverage adverse to the cause of the accused whose cause they
must try. As was observed in Baltimore Radio Show v. State,1"
"Judges are not so 'angelic' as to render them immune to human
influences calculated to affect the rest of mankind." The great
utility of the statute proposed by Justice Meyer is that it would
reach newspapermen, broadcasters, and the lawyers and prosecutors
who supply them with information. This, of course, would be a most
stimulating deterrent to the publication of information prejudicial
to the fair trial of the criminal accused.
The danger, of course, of putting too much reliance on a statute
is that no statute, however superbly drafted, can remove the
fundamental dilemma raised in any clash of competing constitutional
values. A statute can codify the problem. It can indicate a legis-
lative preference in a particular situation as to which constitutional
right should be emphasized. But the question still remains whether
the emphasis required by statute is constitutionally permissible.
I suggest that we reflect on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in Bridges when he spoke in defense of the use of the contempt
power not to prevent criticism of the judiciary but to protect impartial
adjudication. He said:
. . . [T]he Bill of Rights is not self-destructive. Freedom
of expression can hardly carry implications that nullify the
guarantees of impartial trials. And since courts are the
ultimate resorts for vindicating the Bill of Rights, a state
may surely authorize appropriate historic means to assure
that the process for such vindication be not wrenched from
its rational tracks into the more primitive melee of passion
and pressure. The need is great that courts be criticized,
but just as great that they be allowed to do their duty.-8
17. 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497, 508 (1949).
18. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 284 (1941).
